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ABSTRACT
Structurally estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model using coverage ratios that include
non-tariff barriers leads to biased parameter estimates. We develop a ``protection for sale'' theoretical
framework consistent with the data, by explicitly allowing for non-tariff barriers. Introducing partial
rent capturing we obtain a testable specification which finds support in the data. Our results suggest
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Successive rounds of international trade negotiations have successfully reduced the use of
tariﬀs. With a few exceptions, developed countries now face strict limitations, imposed by
the GATT–WTO, on the magnitude of taxes that they can levy on imports. This does not
imply that protectionist interests are no longer able to inﬂuence policy–makers, but rather
that protectionist policies now often take the form of non-tariﬀ barriers (NTB) which, as
shown by Bradford (2003b), are quantitatively very important. In light of this development,
it is not surprising that the leading framework for the analysis of endogenous trade policy
formation — Grossman and Helpman (1994)’s protection for sale model — has been tested
using NTB’s coverage ratios as the dependent variable.1 While their use seems justiﬁed
by the institutional setting and the increased importance of non-tariﬀ barriers, Grossman
and Helpman (1994)’s original theory was meant to analyze the tariﬀ formation process.
Importantly, while tariﬀs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection,
NTB do not. Thus, using NTB’s coverage ratios as the dependent variable to test this model
is likely to lead to biased parameter estimates.2
To overcome the discrepancy between the theory and the data, we modify the protection
for sale model to allow for non-tariﬀ barriers that do not necessarily generate revenue for the
government. In our model, lobbies representing politically active industries try to inﬂuence
an incumbent government’s choice of trade policies which will be a combination of tariﬀs and
quantitative restrictions. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) the interaction is modelled
as a menu auction, i.e. as a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, organized lobbies oﬀer
political contributions that are conditional on the entire vector of trade policies available to
the government, i.e. they also depend on the protection awarded to other industries. In the
second stage, the government chooses a policy vector that maximizes the weighted sum of
political contributions and aggregate welfare, and collects the contributions. Importantly,
if an import tariﬀ is implemented for a particular product, the government fully captures
the associated revenue. If a quantitative restriction is chosen, the degree of rent capturing—
where the rent results from the diﬀerence between the domestic and the international price
of the product—depends on the particular NTB: With a voluntary export restraint, the
foreign exporter captures the associated rent and the domestic government receives nothing.
If import licenses are allocated through a competitive auction, the government fully captures
the associated rent. If the auction is less than competitive, rent capturing will only be partial.
2In order to capture all these possibilities, our model allows for any degree of rent capturing.
Solving the game, we obtain an augmented trade policy equation that allows us to identify
the degree of rent capturing. Using a three-digit cross-section of US manufacturing industries
for 1983, which has been exploited also by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Eicher and Osang
(2002), and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), we estimate our augmented speciﬁcation
employing both a maximum likelihood and a minimum distance estimator. We ﬁnd that only
part of the rents associated with trade barriers are captured. Irrespective of the econometric
methodology, our results show that the U.S. government appropriates only between 72 and 75
percent of the rents associated with trade policy. In addition, we can reject the assumption
of perfect rent capturing that is implicit in the existing literature.
Allowing for partial rent capturing also aﬀects the other structural parameters of the
model. In particular, our estimates of the implied share of the population involved in lobbying
activities are lower and more realistic than in Goldberg and Maggi (1999),3 even though the
government’s weight on social welfare continues to be large.4 Interestingly, while in Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) the low level of average protection granted by the US government could
be rationalized by either the high weight attached to aggregate welfare or by the extremely
large share of the population that is organized, our analysis allows to dismiss the latter
as a possible explanation. Thus, while our results emphasize the importance of taking the
structural approach seriously, i.e. of having a theoretical model consistent with the data,
they oﬀer additional support for the protection for sale framework.
2 Non-tariﬀ Barriers
International trade negotiations have been quite successful in reducing tariﬀs. Yet protec-
tionism is far from dead as is illustrated by the pervasive use of non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs)
even by countries that profess a free–trade orientation. NTBs comprise a long list of mea-
sures that alter, however indirectly, the prices and quantities of trade ﬂows. Examples
include import quotas, health and safety standards, biased government procurement, lax
antitrust enforcement, burdensome customs procedures, and the list could go on.5 While
the importance of NTBs has been widely recognized, measuring their quantitative eﬀects
presents considerable conceptual and practical diﬃculties (see Deardorﬀ and Stern (1997)).
At a theoretical level, the most satisfactory approach involves the computation of price
gaps. The basic idea behind this methodology is that barriers to arbitrage across national
3borders should be considered barriers to trade. In other words, once the unavoidable costs
involved in shipping goods between countries are taken into account, if a price gap still exists
between equivalent commodities in both economies, we can conclude that the higher-priced
market is protected. This price gap can then be used as a direct measure of the extent of
protection, resulting in a tariﬀ equivalent that represents the total eﬀect of all trade barriers.
Clearly, this approach poses demanding requirements on the availability of detailed price data
for the goods considered. The data needs to be comparable across countries, that is, the
goods must share similar qualitative characteristics etc. This approach has been pursued by
Bradford (2003b) who uses the 1999 survey of highly disaggregate price data compiled by the
OECD to compute purchasing power parity adjusted exchange rates. These data are likely
to represent the best available measures for international comparisons, as OECD researchers
made every eﬀort to compare equivalent products from every country. The results obtained
are striking and we report the numbers for the U.S. aggregated up to 26 GTAP sectors, in
Table 1.6
) [Table 1 approximately here] (
The ﬁrst column lists the nominal tariﬀ rate and the second the NTB’s tariﬀ equivalent
as estimated by Bradford (2003a). Note that the world price has been normalized to one, so
that a value of, for example, 1.064 for the tariﬀ rate on “Vegetables, fruit, nuts” indicates
a 6.4 percent tariﬀ. In the third column, we have calculated the share of NTB in total
protection.7 As we can see, the extent of protection granted through NTB is on average
substantially higher than the tariﬀ. On average, 60 percent of the tariﬀ equivalent of total
protection takes the form of NTB. Among the highly protected sectors, crops as well as
vegetable oils appear to be subject to extensive NTB, with tariﬀ equivalents in the order
of 52 and 45 percent respectively, representing 96 and 87 percent respectively of the total
protection. In sectors such as live animals and petroleum, on the other hand, protection
mostly takes the form of import tariﬀs. The main message that emerges from Table 1 is
that NTB are quantitatively very important and any analysis that wants to explain the
endogenous formation of trade policies should take this into account.
It is important to remember though that NTB often do not allow the government to
completely capture the rents associated with the distortion. For this reasons, using NTB’s
coverage ratios8 as the dependent variable in estimating the protection for sale model is
likely to lead to a bias in the parameter estimates. To remedy this problem, we now turn to
extending the basic model to accommodate partial rent capturing.
43 The Model
The speciﬁc factors model of trade forms the economic foundation of Grossman and Helpman
(1994)’s ‘protection for sale’ approach. A small, open economy consists of 1 + n sectors,
indexed by i = 0;:::;n, that produce under constant returns to scale. Sectors f1;:::;ng each
use a sector speciﬁc factor plus a common mobile factor. The exogenously given world market
price for the output of each of these sectors is denoted by p¤
i, while the corresponding domestic
price is p¤
i +ti, where ti is the import tariﬀ imposed on this commodity.9 Alternatively, since
our framework allows for other trade policy instruments, ti can equally represent the shadow
value of a quantity restriction.
Good zero is manufactured using only the mobile factor, which can be thought of as
unskilled labor, with an input output coeﬃcient of one, and will be used as the num´ eraire,
i.e. p0 = 1. Strictly positive production in this sector implies that the wage of the mobile
factor will also equal one, and the same holds for the world market price p¤
0, if we allow for free
trade in this commodity. The production possibilities of the other n sectors are summarized
by proﬁt functions ¼i(pi) that can be interpreted as rewards to the speciﬁc factors.
The economy is populated by N agents who might diﬀer in their factor endowment. All of
them supply one unit of labor, and at most one sector speciﬁc factor. Let ®i be the fraction
of the population that owns the speciﬁc factor i. All agents share the same preferences
represented by a quasi-linear, additively separable utility function u = x0 +
Pn
i=1 ui(xi),
where xi is the individual’s consumption of good i and the subutility functions ui(:) are
diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. Optimizing subject to a given income level E, individual
demands are given by xi = di(pi) ´ (u0
i)¡1(pi) of goods i = 1;:::;n and x0 = E¡
Pn
i=1 pidi(pi)
for the num´ eraire. Domestic demand for good i can be satisﬁed through domestic production
and/or imports. The latter are deﬁned as follows:
mi = Ái(ti) ´ Ndi(p
¤
i + ti) ¡ yi(p
¤
i + ti);
where yi is the domestic supply of commodity i derived from ¼i(pi) via Hotelling’s lemma.
Note that since mi(ti) is strictly decreasing, it can be inverted. This is convenient for our




Since our generalization of the model allows trade policy to take the form of tariﬀs as
well as quotas, let Q denote the subset of sectors that face quantity restrictions and T the
5remaining sectors that are subject to tariﬀs. Note that Q or T could well be empty. If the
former is empty, we are back in the traditional protection for sale model that only allows
for tariﬀs. If the latter is empty, all sectors are subject to a quantity restriction. In what
follows, we consider the general mixed case in which some sectors are protected by a tariﬀ,
while others are protected by a quantity restriction and instead of endogenizing the choice
of policy instruments, as in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000), we will rely on the data to
inform us about the actual degree of rent capturing and the implied policy mix.10 In line
with this objective, we assume that in each sector i 2 Q a percentage °i 2 [0;1] of the rent
associated with trade policy is captured by the domestic government.
We can now introduce the trade policy game. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we
assume that only the speciﬁc factor owners in an exogenously given subset L of the non-
num´ eraire sectors11 have become organized and submit contribution schedules Ci(t;q) to the
government, which depend on the entire policy vector chosen, where t is a vector of tariﬀs
applied to all sectors i 2 T and, similarly, q is a vector of quantity restrictions applied to all
sectors i 2 Q. In other words, the lobbies specify their monetary payment contingent on the
policy vector chosen, where the policy vector is a mix of tariﬀs for one subset of sectors and
quantity restrictions for the other. Depending on the institutional setting, such payments
might involve illicit bribes or take the form of legal campaign support. The government
subsequently grants or denies protection by choosing the domestic policy vector (t;q), and
collects the contributions from the lobbying sectors.
Having described the strategy choice of the actors, let us turn to their respective payoﬀs.
Each sector, lobbying or not, receives a gross payment Wi(t;q) given by
Wi(t;q) = li + ¼i(p
¤
i + ti) + ®iN(r + s) 8i 2 T (1)




i (qi)) + ®iN(r + s) 8i 2 Q (2)
where equations (1) and (2) respectively describe the gross welfare of a sector protected by a
tariﬀ and a quota.12 More speciﬁcally, li is the total unskilled labor supply of the owners of
speciﬁc factor i and thus the ﬁrst term on the right hand side represents labor income. The
second term is the reward to the speciﬁc factor. Remembering that ®i is the fraction of the
population that owns speciﬁc factor i, we follow Grossman and Helpman (1994) and assume
that the ﬁscal revenues associated with trade policy are rebated uniformly as lump-sum
payments.13 The last term is then the share of sector i in total ﬁscal revenue (Nr(t;q;°))






















The ﬁrst term on the right hand side describes the revenues accruing to the government from
those sectors in which a tariﬀ is implemented, while the second represents the revenues raised
by the government from those sectors where quantitative restrictions are used instead. Re-
membering that Á
¡1
i (qi) is the tariﬀ equivalent of a quota qi, the second term then represents
the sum of the fractions °i < 1 of the (tariﬀ equivalent) ﬁscal revenues actually captured by





























where again we distinguish between those sectors that receive protection in the form of a
tariﬀ and those that are protected by means of a quantitative restriction.14
In determining the policy vector (t;q) to be granted to each sector—in the form of tariﬀs
for one subset of sectors and quantity restrictions for the others—the government weighs
the sum of aggregate welfare against the monetary contributions paid by the lobbies, i.e. it








As is well known, this objective function implies that the incumbent politician values one
dollar of campaign contributions in her coﬀers more than one dollar going to the public.
4 Equilibrium Protection Structure
In solving the game between organized sectors and lobbies we look for the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, which is deﬁned as follows
7Deﬁnition 1 The collection (fC0
i (t;q)gi2L;(t0;q0)) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the tariﬀ and quota game if C0
i is feasible for all i 2 L, ¯
Pn
i=1 Wi(t;q), and, given
fC0
j(t;q)gj2Lni, no lobby i has an alternative feasible strategy Ci(t;q) that would yield a
higher (net) payoﬀ.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) derive a useful characterization of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria in menu auctions. We restate their proposition here using our notation:
Proposition 1 (fC0
i (t;q)gi2L;(t0;q0)) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the tariﬀ
and quota game if and only if:
i) C0
i (t;q) is feasible 8i 2 L,
ii) (t0;q0) 2 argmax (1 ¡ ¯)
P
i2L Ci(t;q) + ¯
Pn
i=1 Wi(t;q),
iii) (t0;q0) 2 argmax (1 ¡ ¯)
P
i2L Ci(t;q) + ¯
Pn
i=1 Wi(t;q) + Wi(t;q) ¡ Ci(t;q) 8i 2 L,
iv) 8i 2 L;9(ti;qi) 2 Rn that maximizes (1 ¡ ¯)
P
i2L Ci(t;q) + ¯
Pn
i=1 Wi(t;q) such that
C0
i (ti;qi) = 0.
Assuming diﬀerentiability of the contribution schedules and combining conditions ii) and







rWi(t;q) = 0 (3)
Calculating the gradient of the sectors’ gross pay-oﬀ function, we obtain:
@Wi
@tj
= (±i;j ¡ ®i) yj(p
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j + tj) 8j 2 T
@Wi
@qj
























where ±i;j = 1 if i = j and zero otherwise.15 Substituting these partial derivatives back into
equation (3) and rearranging we obtain the following result:

































8i 2 Q (5)
where Ii is an indicator that takes a value of one if the sector is organized and zero otherwise,
®L =
P
i2L ®i describes the fraction of the population that is organized, zi =
yi
mi is the inverse
of the import penetration ratio, and ei = ¡
m0
ipi
mi is the absolute value of the elasticity of import
demand.
The equilibrium tariﬀs correspond exactly to the modiﬁed Ramsey rule derived by Gross-
man and Helpman (1994). Organized sectors obtain positive protection (since Ii ¡ ®L > 0)
whereas unorganized sectors face negative protection, be it in the form of import subsidies
or export taxes. To understand this result, consider the case where lobby membership com-
prises almost the entire population (®L ! 1). In this case organized sectors, that are given
special consideration by the government, internalize the negative eﬀect of protection on con-
sumer surplus (net of tariﬀ revenue) and the government policy chosen for those sectors
converges towards free trade. At the same time, unorganized sectors, owned by a small part
of the population which is accorded less weight in the government’s objective function, suﬀer
negative protection because this suits the (consumer) interests of the organized majority. If
lobbies represent a smaller share of the population, both eﬀects become less pronounced and
organized sectors ask for, and obtain, positive protection while unorganized sectors suﬀer less
negative protection. In addition, we have the familiar Ramsey pricing eﬀect that protection
(in either direction) is smaller (in absolute value) the higher is the import demand elasticity,
because a higher elasticity renders the policy intervention more distortive. Similarly, pro-
tection decreases in import penetration (increases in its inverse) because import penetration
also increases the ineﬃciency when holding the elasticity constant. Finally, protection de-
creases with the weight attached by the government to aggregate welfare (¯), because this
implies that the government cares more about eﬃciency.
Whereas the outcome for tariﬀs is standard, the result for quotas and in particular the
additional term in equation (5) requires further explanation. Consider the case where the
quota rent is fully captured (°i = 1). The tariﬀ equivalent of the quota then equals the
solution for the tariﬀ. The above proposition thus implies:
9Corollary 1 Enacting a quantity restriction in a particular market is equivalent to setting
the corresponding tariﬀ as long as the quota rent is fully captured (°i = 1).
That is, choosing a (binding) quota or a tariﬀs allows the government to determine the
outcome in the market for a traded good, i.e. the combination of quantity demanded and
domestic price. The lobbies’ contributions then depend only on the market outcome, and
not on the policy instrument used to achieve it.
Consider now the more general case in which rent is only partially captured. How does


















The sign of this derivative, and thus the eﬀect of partial capturing on the protection level,
depends on the term in square brackets. Assuming that sector i is organized, lower rent cap-
turing will tend to increase the equilibrium protection level the lower the import penetration
ratio, the smaller the government’s weight on aggregate welfare, and the more concentrated
the ownership of the organized sectors.
5 Empirical Test
We now proceed to empirically test the predictions of our model that explicitly allows for
non-tariﬀ barriers. A number of studies have estimated the original Grossman and Helpman
(1994) model for a cross section of U.S. manufacturing industries using coverage ratios as
the measure of protection. Even though the theory was originally developed for tariﬀs,
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) in their well known paper ﬁnd that “the theoretical model is
not inconsistent with our data.” Similar conclusions have been reached by Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Eicher and Osang (2002). The data we use is the same as in
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Eicher and Osang (2002) and Mitra, Thomakos and
Ulubasoglu (2005). It covers the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1983 at the 3-digit level, and
contains 107 observations. Appendix A contains details on the construction of the variables
and the diﬀerent sources from which the data were obtained.
To evaluate the augmented model that allows for quotas or other instruments that im-
perfectly capture rents, we need to transform the equilibrium tariﬀ and quota equations (4)
10and (5) to obtain an empirically testable speciﬁcation. Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999)
and Eicher and Osang (2002) we bring the elasticity on the left hand side of the regression to
counter measurements errors, and we add an additive error term.16 The estimating equations
for our model thus take the form
ti
1 + ti




















+ ¸ + ²2i; 8i 2 Q (8)
where µ =
1¡¯
¯+®L(1¡¯) and Ã = ¡
®L(1¡¯)
¯+®L(1¡¯) and correspondingly µ0 = 1




° . Notice the non-additive structure of the relationship predicted by the model: the
inverse of the import penetration ratio (
yi
mi) enters interactived with the political organization
dummy. The model predicts that the direction of the relationship between trade protection
and import penetration depends crucially on whether a sector is organized or not. At the
same time, the extent of protection that an organized sector receives (likewise the extent of
negative protection for unorganized sectors), will depend on its import penetration.
If product i is protected by a policy instrument which allows for complete rent capturing,
protection will be set according to equation (7). This is the implicit assumption underlying
previous empirical work. On the other hand, if only a share °i < 1 of the rents is captured
domestically, the optimal level of protection is determined by equation (8). In the empirical
implementation, the lack of time series data forces us to impose a uniform degree of rent
capturing across industries.17 The sign restrictions implied by the model are that µ > 0,
Ã < 0, ¸ · 0 and (µ + Ã) > 0.
Comparing the two equations, the presence of a negative constant term in equation (8)
indicates that by making protection more expensive from the point of view of the domestic
government, imperfect rent capturing uniformly lowers its level compared to the situation
when a tariﬀ is deployed. In addition, the slopes of the inverse of the import penetration
ratio and of the interaction term are larger than under the tariﬀ (i.e. µ0 > µ and Ã0 > Ã).
Empirically, if the observed rate of protection for organized sectors is very responsive to low
rates of import penetration18 and the sectors are protected by tariﬀs, i.e. we are in the case
described by equation (7), this will mean that the weight attached by the government to
aggregate welfare (¯) is low and/or that a small fraction of the population (®L) is lobbying.
In contrast, if sectors are protected by NTB and equation (8) applies, a similar empirical
relationship could be rationalized by a low degree of rent capturing.
11Two econometric issues have to be addressed when estimating the model. First, because
coverage ratios lie between zero and one, the dependent variable is potentially censored
on both sides.19 The maximum likelihood estimator in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) jointly
estimates the equation of interest—(7) or (8)—together with two reduced form equations
(see below). The censoring of the dependent variable leads to a Tobit model, if we are
willing to assume that the error terms ²1i and ²2i are normally distributed. The dependent
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i is a latent variable that can be thought of as the ‘true’ level of protection,
proportional to the coverage ratio by a factor ¹.20
Second, there are good reasons to believe that the two explanatory variables in the model,
import penetration and the binary political organization variable, might be endogenous. This
is certainly the case for import penetration, because sectors that receive low protection rates
will, ceteris paribus, have larger import penetration (lower y=m) in the data. We need to
instrument to control for this reverse causality. In our theoretical model, the organization
dummy is exogenous. However, since we follow the existing literature and use contribution
data to assign the political organization dummies and contributions are endogenous in our
model, in the empirical implementation it might be desirable to treat Ii as econometrically
endogenous.21 As it turns out, in their implementation of Grossman and Helpman’s model,
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) report that their results are virtually identical if Ii is instead
treated as exogenous. For this reason, we carry out our estimation using both approaches,
obtaining comparable results.22 In the estimation of Goldberg and Maggi (1999), both
endogenous explanatory variables are modelled as linear functions of a set of instruments,
and the tendency to organize is treated as a latent variable, which is observed only when it
crosses a threshold, deﬁned as in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) as a political action committee
contribution for a three digit industry equal to 100 million dollars.23. Formally, to take into

















The variables in Z are the instruments introduced by Treﬂer (1993).24 Input shares for 12
production factors are used to proxy for comparative advantage, and hence we expect them
to be good predictors for the level of import penetration. Given that factor endowments de-
termine these variables, they are plausibly uncorrelated with the error term of the protection
equation. To these instruments, we add the variables commonly used in the literature to
explain political organization. These include proxies for the concentration in the upstream
and downstream industries, for the geographic and ownership concentration in each industry,
and for the organization of the workforce. While these factors are likely to predict the ability
of an industry to become politically organized and generate contributions to inﬂuence trade
policy, they have wider importance in the industries, and as a result they can plausibly be
considered uncorrelated with the error term. For the vast majority of sectors, trade openness
is suﬃciently low as to enable us to treat the organization of the industry as exogenous to
the shock in the protection equation. A more complete justiﬁcation of the approach is given
in Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
In implementing the maximum likelihood estimation, we will assume the error terms
in equations 9, 10 and 11 to be jointly normally distributed and potentially correlated.
The maximum likelihood estimates are reported in Table 2, where for comparison we have
included the baseline estimates of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) in the ﬁrst column. The second
column presents our results for the special case in which rent capturing is complete. Our
estimates are similar, except for small diﬀerences in the reduced form coeﬃcients, which lead
to a lower implied share of the population involved in lobbying. These are due to residual
diﬀerences in the data set.25 Appendix B provide details on the exact implementation of our
methodology and the derivation of our likelihood function.
) [Table 2 approximately here] (
In the more general case where not all the rents from protection are captured domestically,
equation (8) applies. The results for this case are reported in column (3). Most importantly,
13the negative constant term indicates that the U.S. government, realizing that the use of
NTBs leads to an additional welfare loss, chooses—ceteris paribus—a uniformly lower level
of protection. This interpretation is conﬁrmed by the implied value for °, the degree of rent
capturing, which is estimated signiﬁcantly less than one. In particular, our estimates imply
that only 72 percent of the potential rents are actually appropriated by the U.S. government.
Note that the estimated degree of rent capturing ° can be given a more general interpre-
tation. In practice, protection is set at a much more disaggregate level than the three digit
SIC industries in our data set. Tariﬀs as well as other trade policy tools will be employed
for diﬀerent products in every industry, so both equations are relevant. Equation (8) can
be understood as a weighted average of both original formulations. Suppose that a fraction
± of the products in industry i are protected by a tariﬀ (rents are fully captured) and the
remainder by a quota (a fraction °0 of the rents are captured, depending on how it is allo-
cated). The linear combination of the two equations with the appropriate weights leads to




±°0 + (1 ¡ ±)
:
° is a function of the structural coeﬃcients ± and °0 that cannot be identiﬁed separately. An
estimated ° of 0.72 is consistent with an industry protected by a quota of which 72 percent
is captured, as well as with an industry where half of the products are protected by tariﬀs
and the other half by a quota, of which 56 percent is captured, etc.
Compared to the baseline case in columns (1) and (2), the diﬀerence between organized
and unorganized sectors remains, as can be readily seen from the highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on the interaction term. Organized sectors receive signiﬁcantly higher protection than their
unorganized counterparts. It might seem surprising at ﬁrst that import penetration alone
does not play a signiﬁcant role. Notice, however, that we are essentially estimating two
diﬀerent coeﬃcients for each subset of the sample, organized and unorganized sectors. The
coeﬃcient for the organized subsample is the sum of the two coeﬃcients reported above. It
is only information from the unorganized sectors that would allow us to separately identify
the role of import penetration. The theoretical model, of course, predicts that unorganized
sectors should receive negative protection. Since the coverage ratios are censored at zero,
this implies that if the model were deterministic, we should not have any information on this
eﬀect coming from the unorganized subsample. In the stochastic context at hand, obtaining
the predicted negative coeﬃcient must be due to large errors, which in turn explain the
14insigniﬁcance of this coeﬃcient.
The third sign prediction of the model, namely that the sum of the two reduced form
coeﬃcients is larger than zero ﬁnds strong support in the data.26 This is reﬂected in the
lower implied share of the population that is organized (®L). While Goldberg and Maggi
(1999) estimate that over 80 percent of the population is involved in trade-related lobbying,
we ﬁnd a more reasonable estimate of 34 percent, which is closer to the share of the workforce
employed in organized sectors (slightly below 50 percent).
Similar to the previous literature, the weight on aggregate welfare in the government’s
objective function (¯) is estimated to be very high. Combined with the low estimated
share of the population involved in lobbying, it invalidates the ineﬃciency of lobbying as
an explanation for the low average amount of protection granted by the U.S. government.
The government values aggregate welfare and implements little or no protection for the
majority of industries, while selectively granting some protection to a few industries which
are organized. Average protection will be low, but sectors that lobby will still beneﬁt.27
Partial rent capturing could provide yet another way to rationalize the low observed rates
of protection. The fraction of rents that are not captured domestically, i.e. the ineﬃciency
inherent in the trade policy, is taken into account as an additional cost in the trade-oﬀ
between welfare and contributions. If ° were estimated close to zero, a small weight on
aggregate welfare would be suﬃcient to deter protection. While we do estimate the fraction
of rents that are captured to be signiﬁcantly below one, rent leakage of 25 to 28 percent is
unlikely to be a signiﬁcant deterrent to protectionism.
We also perform a speciﬁcation test of the augmented model (column 3) versus the
standard speciﬁcation (column 2). This corresponds to testing whether ° is equal to one,
versus the alternative that ° is less than one. The p-value associated with the test statistic
is 0.019, that is, the one-sided test rejects that ° is equal to one at a signiﬁcance level of 2
percent.28 Given the small number of observations, only 107 sectors, this is relatively strong
evidence against perfect rent capturing. The same test using results from the minimum
distance estimator (see below) also rejects equality of ° to one, albeit only at a 10 percent
signiﬁcance level. This conﬁrms the importance of explicitly accounting for partial rent
capturing when estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model.
156 Robustness checks
To further strengthen the validity of our results, we consider a number of robustness checks.
First, we re-estimate the model with the organization dummy included uninteracted, in
addition to the interaction term with inverse import penetration. Second, we vary the
threshold on Political Action Committee contributions that is used in the deﬁnition of the
organization dummy. Third, we estimate the model using a variety of alternative econometric
strategies: (i) the minimum distance estimator from Eicher and Osang (2002), (ii) without
instrumenting for any of the explanatory variables, (iii) with a limited set of instruments for
import penetration, and (iv) with a two-step maximum likelihood estimator, as in Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Finally, we run a set of separate regressions for sectors protected
mainly by tariﬀs and sectors that are protected mainly by non–tariﬀ barriers.
6.1 Including organization dummy uninteracted
Adding the direct eﬀect for the organization status dummy to the estimating equation repre-
sents a uniform level of protection applied to all organized industries. According to the model
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), this variable should not enter in the estimating
equation, as the government can always improve welfare, at the margin, by discriminating
between sectors, i.e. protection should always be a function of import penetration. Including
the dummy uninteracted changes the results considerably. Estimates are reported in column
(4) of Table 2.
The constant term is still estimated to be negative, although its signiﬁcance drops. As
expected, the coeﬃcient on the organization dummy is estimated to be positive, but not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. While the coeﬃcients on the inverse import penetration and on
the interaction term between organization status and the inverse import penetration change
signs, on average organized industries continue to receive positive protection. Evaluated
at the mean import penetration, the predicted depended variable, NTB=(1 + NTB) £ e,
is 0.094 for organized sectors. Because of the negative constant term, average protection
remains negative for unorganized sectors. The negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term
would suggest that the government chooses to distort most where the import penetration is
the largest, which cannot be optimal.
While it is somewhat arbitrary to calculate the structural coeﬃcients without a model
that explains why the organization dummy should enter uninteracted, the rent capturing
16coeﬃcient only depends on the constant term in the reduced form. The point estimate
corresponds to a rent capturing of 82 percent, slightly higher than in the benchmark case.
It is reassuring that the sign of the constant term and the magnitude of the rent capturing
are similar to the benchmark results.
6.2 Diﬀerent thresholds for organization dummy
As a second robustness check, we re-estimate the protection equation using diﬀerent threshold
levels for PAC contributions to classify industries as organized or not. The benchmark cutoﬀ,
taken from Goldberg and Maggi (1999), was $100 million. Alternative thresholds of $200
million or $75 million result in very similar coeﬃcient estimates, see columns (5) and (6) in
Table 2. With the diﬀerent threshold levels, the fraction of industries classiﬁed as organized
drops to 44% or increases to 72%, respectively. As expected, the estimate for ®L varies
in the same direction as these changes. The estimate for ¯, the weight of welfare in the
government’s objective function, is virtually unaﬀected and the same is true for the rent
capturing parameter °. With the high (low) threshold the latter drops (rises) to 70 (74)
percent and continues to be signiﬁcantly below one at the 3 percent level.
6.3 Other estimation methods
The model is also estimated using a variety of alternative econometric strategies. First, we
implement the minimum distance estimator previously used by Eicher and Osang (2002),
where the organization dummy is treated as endogenous. In a ﬁrst stage, the reduced form
equations for each of the three endogenous variables are estimated separately as a function of
the same set of instruments as before. The (inverse) import penetration equation is estimated
by ordinary least squares and the interaction between the organization status and the import
penetration is estimated using a Tobit regression.29 After substituting the two reduced form
equations into the estimation equation of interest, the latter is also estimated using a Tobit
regression. In a second stage, the structural coeﬃcients of the model are obtained from the
reduced form coeﬃcients by GMM. The method is described in more detail in Appendix B
and the exact formula for the weighting matrix and standard errors are in Lee (1995).
Results are reported in Table 3 using the same format as in Table 2, where the ﬁrst
column now reproduces the original results of Eicher and Osang.30 As can be seen from the
table, the results are very similar to those obtained by maximum likelihood. We take this to
17be a sign of robustness. Importantly, the degree of rent capturing (°), which is estimated to
be 75 percent, is hardly diﬀerent from the 72 percent we found using maximum likelihood.
) [Table 3 approximately here] (
Next, in column (4) of Table 3, we present results where we did not instrument for any
of the explanatory variables. We would expect the uninstrumented results to underestimate
the coeﬃcient on inverse import penetration for organized sectors (the interaction term) and
vice versa for unorganized sectors (coeﬃcient on y=m). Sectors that receive high rates of
protection will see their import penetration reduced (y=m increased) and move to the right in
the y=m–protection space. The regression line will become ﬂatter. Moreover, the organiza-
tion status is assumed to be exogenous in the theoretical model, but in practice ﬁrms choose
endogenously to become organized. Sectors that receive a priori low protection, for example
because they are not considered to be strategically important, have a greater incentive to
become organized, leading again to a reverse causality. Overlooking the endogeneity of or-
ganization will underestimate the eﬀect on protection that organization brings, exacerbating
the underestimate of the interaction coeﬃcient.
The results in column (4) of Table 3 conﬁrm that ignoring the endogeneity of I and y=m
will lead to underestimate the eﬀect of import penetration (the sum of the two coeﬃcients)
and of the organization status (the coeﬃcient on the interaction term). The sum of the
two coeﬃcients, which measures the responsiveness of protection to import penetration, is
estimated at 0.0013, down from 0.0104 (column (3) in Table 2) or 0.0168 (column (3) in Table
3). The eﬀect comes largely from the coeﬃcient on the interaction term, which measures
the diﬀerence in protection between organized and unorganized sectors. This coeﬃcient is
now estimated at -0.0016, down from 0.0157 (Table 2) or 0.0190 (Table 3). As a result,
controlling for import penetration the organized sectors now seem to receive less protection
than the average sector in the economy , a result that seems highly counterintuitive. The
structural coeﬃcients indicate that governments place 100% of their weight on welfare and
none on contributions. The parameter measuring the share of the population involved in
lobbying (®L) exceeds one, a result that is again inconsistent with the model. Finally, rent
capturing is nearly perfect, and for all this reasons taking the endogeneity of the explanatory
variables into account is very important.
Next, we limit the number of instruments used to estimate the model. In fact, while as
a group the original instruments used by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Eicher and Osang
18(2002) are signiﬁcant at predicting import penetration,31 many individual coeﬃcients in the
ﬁrst stage regressions are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. To check the robustness of our
results, for the results in column (5) of Table 3 we only include the capital stock and the
four categories of workers (engineers, white collar, skilled, and semiskilled) as instruments for
the inverse import penetration. These were among the most precisely estimated coeﬃcients
in the ﬁrst stage and, as measures of factor abundance, they should be good predictors of
import penetration. The F-statistic for the reduced set of instruments is slightly smaller at
3.042 but still exceeds the threshold for joint-signiﬁcance, which is now 2.31. The structural
coeﬃcient estimates are virtually unchanged from the results with the full set of instruments.
Finally, we also report the results if we use the two-step MLE estimator discussed in
Appendix B. The estimator is consistent, but not eﬃcient, which is borne out by the results
in column (6) of Table 3. None of the reduced form coeﬃcients is estimated signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, even though the signs and magnitudes are relatively similar to the bench-
mark results. The point estimate for rent capturing (°) is slightly higher, estimated at 85
percent, but still signiﬁcantly below one. Estimates for ¯ and ®L are also higher than before,
but all the qualitative conclusions go through unchanged.
6.4 Protection by tariﬀs
As mentioned earlier, previous studies have used NTB coverage ratios to measure protection
even though the original protection for sale model was designed to explain tariﬀ levels. The
commonly oﬀered rationale is that successive GATT/WTO rounds have limited countries’
ability to set tariﬀs. If we use tariﬀ rates to construct the dependent variable, t=(1 + t) £ e,
we obtain similar results, as can be seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. The ﬁrst
column reports the benchmark results, assuming perfect rent capturing, and the second
column contains the results if rent capturing can be imperfect. While the magnitude of the
coeﬃcient estimates are much smaller (tariﬀ rates are much lower than coverage ratios), the
implied structural coeﬃcients are similar. The estimated degree of rent capturing is 1.088
and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, as we would expect in the case of tariﬀs.
) [Table 4 approximately here] (
Our model presupposes that sectors are either protected by tariﬀs or NTB. Estimating
equations (7) and (8) jointly on the full sample of industries is impossible because the
dependent variables diﬀer. Protection by NTB is proxied by coverage ratios which are not
19comparable to percentage tariﬀ rates.32 Even splitting the sample is nontrivial. Consider an
industry with no NTB or tariﬀ protection. Without additional information it is impossible
to know which of equation (7) or (8) applies.
To overcome these diﬃculties we pursue an alternative approach. In column (3) we use
tariﬀs as the dependent variable and exclude those sectors for which NTB protection is
very high. All sectors with coverage ratios exceeding 0.50 are dropped, which amounts to
approximately 20% of the sample, as tariﬀs do not seem to be the primary instrument to
protect these industries. In column (4) we use NTB protection as the dependent variable and
drop sectors with tariﬀ rates exceeding 5 per cent33—as these are arguably well-protected
by tariﬀs. For example, SIC industry 333 ‘primary metals’ only receives very low tariﬀ
protection—the ad valorem rate is on average 0.4%—but it is one of the industries most
heavily protected by NTB, with a coverage ratio of 75 percent. We now drop this industry
from the sample when trying to explain tariﬀ rates. For the results in columns (1) and (2),
this industry would misleadingly be assigned a very low rate of protection (based on the
tariﬀ), even though it is organized and has a high coverage ratio. The estimated degree of
rent capturing (°) is now even closer to one in column (3), as expected for tariﬀs, and it is
reduced to 0.674 in column (4) for NTB’s protection.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the existing discrepancy between the Grossman and Helpman
(1994) theoretical model explaining tariﬀ protection, and its empirical implementations that
have for the most part used NTB’s coverage ratios as the measure of protection. Extending
the model by allowing for partial rent capturing, a salient feature of NTBs, we have derived an
augmented speciﬁcation which we have empirically implemented employing both a maximum
likelihood as well as a minimum distance estimator. Our augmented speciﬁcation ﬁnds
support in the data, and the average degree of rent capturing for our preferred estimators
turns out to be 72-75 percent.
Furthermore, we obtain lower and more reasonable estimates than the previous literature
for the share of the population involved in lobbying activity, while the weight on aggregate
welfare in the government’s objective function continues to be very high, as in previous
implementations. When we allow for partial rent capturing, the low average amount of
protection granted by the U.S. government should be interpreted as the result of the high
20weight associated to aggregate welfare, rather than to the strategic interaction between
competing lobbies. Imperfect rent capturing reduces equilibrium rates of protection, but it
is not the primary reason for the low observed rates of protection. While our results show
the importance of taking the structural approach seriously, i.e. of having a theoretical model
that is consistent with the data, they oﬀer additional support for the protection for sale
framework.
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23Table 1: Tariﬀs and NTBs
GTAP sector Tariﬀ NTB NTB share
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1.064 1.203 0.760
Crops: Garden products 1.020 1.524 0.963
Live Animals: Pets 1.043 1.000 0
Other Ag. Products: Eggs 1.092 1.000 0
Fishing 1.005 1.301 0.984
Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat products 1.108 1.001 0.001
Meat product n.e.c.: Poultry, pork 1.060 1.004 0.063
Vegetable oils and fats 1.065 1.447 0.873
Dairy products 1.082 1.145 0.639
Processed rice 1.054 1.119 0.688
Sugar 1.278 1.000 0
Food products n.e.c. 1.040 1.071 0.640
Beverages and tobacco products 1.126 1.063 0.333
Textiles 1.072 1.271 0.790
Wearing apparel 1.142 1.000 0
Leather products: Footwear 1.143 1.000 0
Wood products 1.045 1.000 0
Paper products, publishing 1.008 1.066 0.892
Petroleum, coal products 1.008 1.000 0
Chemical, rubber, plastic products 1.049 1.287 0.854
Mineral products n.e.c.: Glassware and Tableware 1.087 1.096 0.525
Metal products 1.047 1.192 0.803
Motor vehicles and parts 1.034 1.157 0.822
Electronic equipment 1.042 1.061 0.592
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1.040 1.085 0.680
Manufactures n.e.c. 1.065 1.016 0.198
Weighted geometric means 1.058 1.087 0.602
Source: Bradford (2003a, 2003b) and own calculations
Notes: The international price is normalized to one for all goods. A tariﬀ inclusive
price of 1.064 thus implies a 6.4 % import tariﬀ. A similar argument applies for
non-tariﬀ barriers. Following Bradford (2003a), total protection is deﬁned as the
sum of tariﬀ protection and the tariﬀ equivalent of the existing NTB.
24Table 2: Estimation of the augmented Grossman-Helpman model by MLE
Dependent variable: NTB
1+NTB £ e, sample of 107 sectors
Threshold for I $100m $100m $100m $100m $200m $75m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(y=m) -0.0093¤¤ -0.0081¤¤ -0.0053 0.0083¤¤ -0.0039 -0.0059
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0052)
(y=m) £ I 0.0106¤¤ 0.0166¤¤¤ 0.0157¤¤¤ -0.0098¤ 0.0151¤¤¤ 0.0160¤¤¤
(0.0053) (0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0051)
I 0.3381
(0.3896)
constant -0.3937¤ -0.2187 -0.4336¤ -0.3523
(0.2626) (0.2398) (0.2978) (0.2563)
¯ 0.986 0.983 0.988 1.008 0.989 0.988
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
®L 0.883 0.489 0.338 0.847 0.261 0.370
(0.223) (0.134) (0.244) (0.541) (0.233) (0.284)
° 1.000 1.000 0.718 0.820 0.697 0.739
(0.135) (0.161) (0.145) (0.140)
Log-likelihood -308.2 -305.4 -305.4 -315.8 -295.5
Notes: Variables deﬁnitions: (y=m) is the inverse import penetration ratio and I is the
organization dummy, equal to one if the sector is organized. ¯ is the weight on welfare
in the government’s objective function, ®L is fraction of the population that lobbies, °
is the fraction of rents captured by the government. For the $100m threshold, 63% of
sectors have I=1, 44% for $200m and 72% for $75m. (1) Goldberg and Maggi (1999),
Table 1; (2)-(6) are estimated with maximum likelihood, details and likelihood function
are in Section 5 and Appendix B. We instrument for the inverse import penetration ratio
using the full set of instruments listed in Table A.1. These include measures of com-
petition in upstream and downstream industries, indicators of production technology
and characteristics of the workforce, and factor inputs. Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors on the structural parameters are obtained using the ∆-method. ¤
indicates signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ¤¤ at the 5% level, and ¤¤¤ at the 1% level. In
Columns (2)-(6), the test statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables in
the y=m–equation is 4.1083 (for Column (1) it is 4.131). The statistic is distributed
according to the F(20,86) distribution, with a threshold of 1.70 for signiﬁcance at the
5% level.
25Table 3: Other estimation methods
Dependent variable: NTB
1+NTB £ e, sample of 107 sectors
MDE MDE MDE Tobit MLE MLE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(y=m) -0.0098¤¤¤ -0.0026¤¤ -0.0022 0.0029 -0.0054 -0.0030
(0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0077) (0.0033)
(y=m) £ I 0.0374¤¤¤ 0.0173¤¤¤ 0.0190¤¤¤ -0.0016 0.0140¤ 0.0055
(0.0051) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0075) (0.0038
constant -0.3255¤ -0.0051 -0.3046 -0.1684
(0.2330) (0.0967) (0.215) (0.1131)
F-test for y=m equation 4.108 4.108 3.042 4.108
Â2-test for y=m £ I equation 45.252 45.252 44.970
¯ 0.96 0.982 0.985 1.001 0.989 0.995
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
®L 0.26 0.149 0.117 1.808 0.384 0.545
(0.086) (0.152) (2.171) (0.298) (1.394)
° 1.000 1.000 0.754 0.995 0.766 0.855
(0.189) (0.096) (0.126) (0.082)
Notes: Variables deﬁnitions: (y=m) is the inverse import penetration ratio and I is the or-
ganization dummy, equal to one if the sector is organized. ¯ is the weight on welfare in the
government’s objective function, ®L is fraction of the population that lobbies, ° is the fraction
of rents captured by the government. (1) Eicher and Osang (2002), Table 1 (standard errors
for the structural coeﬃcients and test statistics are not reported). (2)-(3) Estimated with the
same minimum distance estimator, details are in Section 6.3 and Appendix B. The full set of
instruments is used in the ﬁrst stage for each variable. These include measures of competition
in upstream and downstream industries, indicators of production technology and characteris-
tics of the workforce, and factor inputs. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated as in
Lee (1995), controlling for the two-step nature of the estimator. (4) Tobit estimates, treating
both (y=m) and I as exogenous. Structural coeﬃcients are calculated ignoring the uninteracted
organization dummy. (5) Maximum likelihood estimation using a reduced set of instruments
(only the type of workers and capital stock are included). (6) Two-step maximum likelihood
estimation as in Nelson and Olson (1978) using all instruments, ﬁrst stage for (y=m) estimated
by OLS and for y=m £ I by Tobit. Standard errors on the structural parameters are obtained
using the ∆-method. ¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ¤¤ at the 5% level, and ¤¤¤ at the 1% level.
The F-test statistic is distributed according to the F(20,86) distribution in (2), (3), and (6), and
F(5,101) in (5). The thresholds for signiﬁcance at the 5% level are 1.70 and 2.31, respectively.
The Â2-statistics follows the Â2(20) distribution and the corresponding threshold is 31.41.




Protection by Tariﬀ Tariﬀ Tariﬀ NTB
Sectors excluded none none NTB>0.50 Tariﬀ>0.10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
inverse import penetration (y=m) -0.0007¤¤¤ -0.0012¤¤¤ -0.0019¤¤¤ -0.0019
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0040)
(y=m) £ organization dummy 0.0019¤¤¤ 0.0016¤¤¤ 0.0023¤¤¤ 0.0198¤¤¤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0016)
constant term 0.0810 0.0290 -0.4824
(0.0572) (0.0594) (0.3242)
Number of sectors 107 107 79 86
F-test for y=m equation 4.108 4.108 3.429 3.661
Â2-test for y=m £ I equation 45.252 45.252 35.290 41.477
¯ 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.987
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.003)
®L 0.370 0.761 0.809 0.084
(0.139) (0.385) (0.300) (0.020)
° 1.000 1.088 1.030 0.674
(0.068) (0.063) (0.193)
Notes: ¯ is the weight on welfare in the government’s objective function, ®L is fraction
of the population that lobbies, ° is the fraction of rents captured by the government.
Estimation with the minimum distance estimator as in Eicher and Osang (2002), using
the full set of instruments: measures of competition in upstream and downstream indus-
tries, indicators of production technology and characteristics of the workforce, and factor
inputs. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated as in Lee (1995), controlling for
the two-step nature of the estimator. Columns (1)–(3) use tariﬀs in the construction of
the dependent variable, while in column (4) NTB are used, as before. In column (3) sec-
tors with high NTB protection are excluded; column (4) excludes sectors with high tariﬀ
rates. Standard errors on the structural parameters are obtained using the ∆-method. ¤
signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ¤¤ at the 5% level, and ¤¤¤ at the 1% level. The F-statistic
is distributed according to the F(20,86) distribution in (1)-(2), according to F(20,58) in
(3), and F(20,65) in (4). The thresholds for signiﬁcance at the 5% level are 1.70, 1.76,
and 1.74, respectively. The Â2 test statistics follow the Â2(20) distribution throughout
and the corresponding threshold is 31.41.
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We use the same data set that was previously employed by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000).34 It covers the U.S. manufacturing sector in 1983 at the 3-digit level, giving a total
of 107 observations. Below we describe the diﬀerent pieces of information and indicate the
original sources. Summary statistics on all variables are in Table A.1.
Import demand elasticities (ei) are taken from Shiells, Stern and Deardorﬀ (1986).
Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999), the small number of industries with positive import
demand elasticities are set to zero.
Non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBi proxy for Á
¡1
i (qi)), which enter the dependent variable
in the model, are taken from Treﬂer (1993), and aggregated to the 3-digit level using as
weights the value of shipment (from the 1996 NBER productivity database). The extent
of protection is measured by the NTB’s coverage ratio (that is, the fraction of an industrys
imports covered by one or more of such non-tariﬀ measures). Non-tariﬀ barriers includes
price-oriented measures such as antidumping duties and countervailing duties, quantity-
oriented measures such as quotas and voluntary export restraints, and threats of quality and
quantity monitoring etc. Following the transformation of variables in Goldberg and Maggi
(1999), as described in Section 5, we multiply NTBi=(1 + NTBi) by the import elasticity
for the sector (ei) to obtain the actual dependent variable used in the analysis.
Tariﬀ rates (ti) (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)), U.S. post-Tokyo round ad
valorem tariﬀ rate.
Import penetration ratio (mi=yi) (Treﬂer (1993)), the ratio of imports (from the rest
of the world) relative to domestic (U.S.) output; aggregated to the 3-digit level using the
value of shipments as weights.
Organization dummy (Ii), (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)), if total contribu-
tions in a sector exceed a threshold, the dummy takes on the value of one and zero otherwise.
The threshold we use ($100,000,000) is the same as in Goldberg and Maggi (1999). Informa-
tion on Political Action Committee contributions is also taken from Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay (2000); it sums total ﬁrm and union contributions by sector for the 1983-1984
congressional elections. In Table 2 we use alternative thresholds to deﬁne the organization
dummy as a robustness check.
Instrumental variables, (Treﬂer (1993)), aggregated to the 3-digit level using as weights
the value of shipments. A ﬁrst set of variables is commonly used to predict political organi-
28zation. Four variables measure concentration in upstream and downstream industries. Two
variables capture other aspects of concentration: geographic and a high minimum eﬃcient
scale concentrates capital in fewer plants. Finally, unionization and tenure are positively
related to the organization of the workforce, making lobbying more likely. A second set of
variables capture factor endowments and, hence, comparative advantage and are included
mainly to predict import penetration. It measures labor, land, capital, and other inputs,
broken down in several categories. For details on how they are calculated, see Treﬂer (1993).
Buyer concentration: Weighted average of four ﬁrm concentration ratios among buyers
of an industry output (consumers and downstream industries). The four ﬁrm concentration
ratios and the number of ﬁrms are taken from the 1982 Census of Manufactures. Weights
are taken from the 1977 US input output total (direct plus indirect) table with diagonal
elements set to zero.
Seller concentration: Weighted average of four ﬁrm concentration ratios in supplier (up-
stream) industries. The four ﬁrm concentration ratios and the number of ﬁrms are taken
from the 1982 Census of Manufactures. Weights are taken from the 1977 US input output
total (direct plus indirect) table with diagonal elements set to zero.
Buyer (seller) number of ﬁrms: Number of companies scaled by industry sales.
Geographic concentration: Measure of the diﬀerence between population and industry
production patterns across the 50 states.
Minimum eﬃcient scale: Caves (1976) minimum eﬃcient plant size, deﬁned as the per-
centage of industry sales supplied by the median plant. Our data comes from the 1982
Census of Manufactures.
Unionization: Percentage of workers unionized.
Tenure: Average years of tenure by workers in the industry.
Engineers, white collars, Skilled, Semi-skilled; Cropland, Pasture, Forest; Physical capi-
tal, Inventories; Coal, Mineral and petroleum services: All these are factor shares and have
been calculated using the 1977 input–output table for the United States. For each indus-
try and each factor, factor shares are the total (in an input-output sense) factor earnings
generated by producing one dollar of ﬁnal industry output.
29Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard error
Dependent variables:
NTBi
1+NTBi £ ei (dependent variable) 0.1929 (0.5946)
ti
1+ti £ ei (alternative dep. var.) 0.0354 (0.0462)
Explanatory variables:
y=m (inverse import penetration) 34.633 (65.070)
organization dummy 0.6147 (0.4889)
Instruments:
Buyer concentration 0.3691 (0.0618)
Seller concentration 0.3618 (0.1538)
Buyer number of ﬁrms 0.4092 (0.5248)
Seller number of ﬁrms 0.2263 (0.2592)
geographic concentration 0.7097 (0.1431)





White collar 0.1536 (0.0440)
Skilled workers 0.1081 (0.0308)









Notes: Factor shares, including the omitted category ‘unskilled
workers’ sum to 1.
30Appendix B Structural estimation procedures
Maximum likelihood estimation
Estimation of equations (7) or (8) by maximum likelihood poses speciﬁc challenges, because
of the endogenous nature of the explanatory variables, the censoring from below of the
dependent variable, and discrete nature of the organization dummy. As the original paper
by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) is silent on the exact way in which estimation was carried
out, we have experimented with several estimation strategies, yielding similar results. In
the main table of results, Table 2, we choose the method that leads to parameter estimates
values that are closest to the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) results for the original protection
for sale model.
The most straightforward way to estimate the model is by a two-step procedure, initially
proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978). The endogenous variables in the Tobit model are
replaced with consistent ﬁrst-stage estimates. This mirrors the estimation strategy in the
related model of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Import penetration and organization
are replaced with ﬁtted values from, respectively, a least squares and probit regression of
either variable on the full set of instruments. Alternatively, in the ﬁrst stage the interaction
term (I£y=m) can be predicted directly, with a Tobit regression, comparable to the approach
in the minimum distance results. Results for this approach are reported in column (6)
of Table 3. In the former case, where I is predicted separately, results are very similar
(ˆ ° = 0:879; ˆ ¯ = 0:996; ˆ ®L = 0:880).
The F-test for joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in the import penetration equation
and the Â2-tests for the Probit regression of I and Tobit regression of I £ y=m reject the
null hypothesis of joint-insigniﬁcance, conﬁrming that the instruments have predictive value
in the MLE estimation.35 If we limit the set of instruments, using only physical capital and
composition of the workforce for y=m and geographic concentration and composition of the
workforce for I (and the combination of these variables for I £ y=m, results are again very
similar, but the estimates for ° become 0.812 and 0.807).
As Amemiya (1979) has shown, the two-step procedure is consistent, but not asymptot-
ically eﬃcient. Consequently, we have also tried to implement a one-step procedure. We
did not ﬁnd any example in the literature where the coeﬃcient on the interaction of an
endogenous limited dependent variable and another endogenous variable is estimated in a
single step. If we ignore the endogeneity of the organization dummy, we can use the pro-
31cedure proposed in Smith and Blundell (1986). The original estimation by Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) mentions explicitly that: “[...] we also estimated a speciﬁcation in which the
political-organization dummies were treated as econometrically exogenous; this turned out
to make no appreciable diﬀerence, either for the point estimates or the standard errors.”
(p.1143) With only a single endogenous variable on the right-hand side, the log-likelihood
function, after concentrating over ¾2
2 (the variance of the error term in the import penetration

























































Because the results of the one-step estimator are closer to the results obtained by Goldberg
and Maggi (1999), on a slightly diﬀerent data set, and to the minimum distance results, we
used this method for all results in Table 2. Table 3 contains robustness checks using other
estimation methods.
Minimum distance estimator
The minimum distance estimation proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate the
reduced form equations for each of the three endogenous variables separately as a function of
the same set of instruments (Z) used also for the maximum likelihood estimation. The (in-
verse) import penetration equation, equation (B.12), is estimated by ordinary least squares.
The interaction between the organization status and the import penetration, equation (B.13),
is estimated using a Tobit regression. As mentioned in the text, we do not have enough ob-
servations to estimate the reduced form regression for the organization dummy separately
and obtain the reduced form expression for the protection equation by multiplying out the
32interaction term. Therefore, we follow the same pragmatic solution as Eicher and Osang
(2002). Substituting the two endogenous explanatory variables into the estimation equation
of interest, equation (8), we obtain the third reduced form equation, equation (B.14), which
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In the second stage, we estimate the structural coeﬃcients of the model (µ0 and Ã0) from
the reduced form coeﬃcients with a two-step GMM procedure. The estimated coeﬃcients
ˆ ³3
0




using an appropriate weighting matrix constructed from the
scores of the ﬁrst stage regressions. The method is described in detail in Lee (1995), which
also contains all the formulas and a sample algorithm.
Notes
1 See, for instance, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Eicher and Osang (2002) among others.
2Goldberg and Maggi (1999) already pointed out some of the diﬃculties involved in using NTB’s coverage
ratios. Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) and McCalman (2004) have also highlighted this discrepancy,
and have used tariﬀ data to measure protection in the case of Turkey and Australia respectively.
3This alleviates the problem pointed out by Mitra et al. (2002), that a high estimate of the proportion
of the population politically organized and a high estimate of the government’s weight on aggregate welfare
are not mutually consistent.
4In a recent contribution to this journal, Mitra et al. (2005) make substantial headway in this regard.
Taking all sectors to be lobbying, they use the resulting single estimated coeﬃcient to identify the welfare
weight based on assumed values for the share of population involved in lobbying. Their estimation produces
a much more realistic welfare weight implying a government that does care considerably about contributions.
We do not follow their innovative approach here because we want to relate our innovation, namely partial
rent capturing, to the standard empirical protection for sale literature.
5UNCTAD uses 18 diﬀerent categories: quantity, price, quality,threat, advance payment, anti-dumping
duty, anti-dumping investigation, countervailing duty, countervailing duty investigation, authorization, health
33and safety, license, inspection, labelling/marketing/packaging, product characteristics/standards, single chan-
nel, testing, embargoes/prohibitions. See also the discussion in Deardorﬀ and Stern (1997).
6Information on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) can be obtained from the following web-
site: http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/default.asp. For further details on the methodology see Bradford
(2003a) and Bradford (2003b).
7Total protection is calculated as the sum of the tariﬀ and NTB’s tariﬀ equivalent rates.
8This measure is constructed by determining ﬁrst, at the tariﬀ line level of disaggregation, whether a
product is subject or not to one of 18 diﬀerent types of NTB identiﬁed by UNCTAD. The “coverage ratio”
is then calculated at the 3-digit level, and measures the percent of imports covered by one or more NTB.
9The original model also allows for import subsidies as well as export taxes and subsidies. The subsequent
literature has largely disregarded these policies in line with the empirical facts or even explicitly excluded
them, as in Levy (1999) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000). In our context, subsidies would paradoxically
be only partially funded by the government, and for this reason we follow the more recent literature and do
not consider them.
10Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000) propose a model where this choice is endogenous. In their model,
quantitative restrictions emerge only if domestic importers (or foreign exporters) carry substantial political
clout.
11Remember that not all individuals need to own sector-speciﬁc factors. In particular, some might own
only unskilled labor and, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that unskilled workers are not
able to organize. As a result, even if all non-num´ eraire sectors in the economy were organized, the share of
the population that is organized might well be strictly less than one.
12Again note that this is a generalization of the standard model where Q is empty and T contains all
non-num´ eraire sectors.
13Note that allowing for a non-uniform distribution of these payments would aﬀect the policy vector as
it changes the weights assigned to diﬀerent parts of the rent. The eﬀects of partial rent capturing are in a
sense similar yet more extreme, as part of the rent is not given any consideration at all. We are grateful to
an anonymous referee for pointing out this analogy.
14This result follows immediately from the assumption of quasi-linearity and separability of the preferences.
See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for further details.
15Note that we do not need to distinguish sectors that face a tariﬀ from sectors subject to a quota (that
is, whether i 2 T or i 2 Q) because only the direct proﬁt term would diﬀer; however, the indicator in front
of this term does not switch on since i cannot equal j for cross derivatives.
16We follow this particular speciﬁcation choice for comparison purposes. As pointed out by Goldberg and
Maggi (1999), page 1140, several other possible empirical strategies could be pursued.
17We relax this assumption in the section on robustness checks where we distinguish sectors that are
covered primarily by tariﬀs and those that are subject mainly to quantity restrictions.
18In other words, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is large.
19In the data, only left-censoring actually occurs.
20Rather than estimating ¹, we follow Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and ﬁx it to a value of one. We tried
alternative values (2 and 3) and the structural coeﬃcient estimates are not sensitive to this change.
3421Unfortunately, all the standard tests for endogeneity are invalid in the current model, because the
dependent variable is censored and the potentially endogenous variable Ii enters the model interacted with
a (certainly) endogenous variable (y=m).
22See Appendix B for more details.
23Robustness checks using diﬀerent thresholds are discussed in Section 6.2.
24See Appendix A for details.
25Like Eicher and Osang (2002) – see footnote 7, page 1707 – we were not able to obtain the same dataset
used by Goldberg and Maggi (1999). Furthermore, following Eicher and Osang (2002), we have used political
contributions for the 1983-1984 cycle to construct the organization dummy while Goldberg and Maggi (1999)
use data for the 1981–1982 campaign.
26The t-statistic for this test is 4.646.
27The parameter estimates in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) are
consistent with both alternative explanations for the low rates of observed protection. The weight of aggre-
gate welfare in the government’s objective function (¯) and the share of the population involved in lobbying
(®L) are both estimated very high. The sizeable cross-sectoral variation in rates of protection in the data
points towards ¯ over ®L as an explanation for low average protection rates. In contrast with previous
results, though, we estimate the share of the population involved in lobbying much lower: between 12 and
34 percent.
28A likelihood ratio test leads to the same conclusion. Note that the standard error on ° is calculated
using the ∆-method. While the constant term in the estimating equation is only marginally signiﬁcant, the
structural parameter ° is a nonlinear function of this parameter.
29Ideally, the reduced form equation explaining the organization status as a function of the instruments
should be estimated with a Probit regression. However, the interaction of the reduced forms for organization
status and inverse import penetration (I£y=m) would generate more reduced form coeﬃcients than we have
observations available. Therefore, we follow the same pragmatic solution as Eicher and Osang (2002).
30Our results diﬀer somewhat from those obtained by Eicher and Osang (2002), as can be seen comparing
the ﬁrst two columns in Table 2. We veriﬁed with them that we used the exact same estimation approach.
We also use the same data set, provided by Kishore Gawande. One diﬀerence is that they dropped one
industry, likely because of missing values for one of the variables required in the other model they estimate.
31The F-statistic is 4.108.
32Ideally one should use the tariﬀ equivalent of NTB, as in the second column of Table 1, but those are
not available at the SIC industry level.
33This represents about 25% of the sample, and we have chosen this cut-oﬀ point because the distribution
of tariﬀ rates exhibits a natural break at this point.
34Thanks are due to these authors for generously making their data available to us. Eicher and Osang
(2002) use the same data set, but we have been unable to obtain the data used in Goldberg and Maggi
(1999).
35We do not report the ﬁrst stage estimates, but they are very similar to those obtained in Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) which use the same explanatory variables, but their left-hand side variables refer to a diﬀerent
year.
35